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PRACTISING LAW IN A COMMERCIAL 
ENVIRONMENT: Is THE CUSTOMER 
ALWAYS RIGHT? 
Anne 0 'Brien· 
It is maintained by some that the concept of professionalism is outdated and incompatible with 
the business entities which law firms have become. In this article the author examines the 
concept of professionalism and· the tensions that exist in modern legal practise. She concludes 
that, while adjustment is necessary, the two are not incompatible. Indeed continued adherence 
to the principle of professionalism is necessary to the health of any legal practise. 
I fear that lawyers in New Zealand are in danger of losing their souls, and I fear for our future 
if we cannot win back our sense of purpose.1 
It was in these terms that, in May 1996, Austin Forbes QC, then President of the New 
Zealand Law Society, described the law as a profession in crisis. He cited loss of business 
in the provinces; loss of market share to other professions; the increasing cost of litigation 
placing access to the courts beyond the reach of ordinary New Zealanders; the dishonesty of 
some members and a pressured lifestyle as factors contributing to a "malaise within the 
profession". He called for "a renewed vision and ideal for our pr0fession" 
This article focuses on the concept of 'professionalism' and whether it has relevance for 
modern legal practice. I believe that the vision of law as a calling and of lawyers as members 
of a profession has not failed, nor is it necessarily "in severe trouble".2 In fact, it is 
precisely because of the increasing pressures of modem legal practice that the concept of 
professionalism is important. I intend first, to address what is meant by the concept; 
secondly, to consider the nature of modem legal practice; and thirdly, to reflect on the 
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modern lawyer as a professional. Because of the limited nature of this article I shall confine 
myself to addressing only one aspect of legal practice - the relationship between lawyer and 
corporate client. 
I WHAT IS "PROFESSIONALISM"? 
I think the hallmarks of a profession can be summed up in two words- integrity and service.3 
Traditionally, the notion of the professional has been defined by contrasting it with that 
of the entrepreneur. The fundamental difference is underlying motivation: the entrepreneur's 
primary goal is the acquisition of wealth4 while the professional is primarily motivated by 
service to society. The theory of professionalism rejects the notion of dependence on the self-
regulating market based on individual self-interest and embraces the ideals of identification 
with, and service to, society as a whole. This is not service of the self-sacrificmg kind. 
Although service is to be the primary focus of the professional, they are not to go 
unrewarded, however the acquisition of wealth is incidental, and subservient, to the 
primary focus of service. The professional's reward for service is based not on "market 
value" but on "reasonable value".5 This assures the professional of basic financial security 
so that they are free to concern themselves with perfecting their discipline in the service of 
their clients and of society as a whole. 
Further, professionalism rejects the concept of a universal individual in favour of cluster 
groups differentiated by role. Within the cluster group members develop a culture reflective 
of and consistent with the shared goals and values of society, but often more demanding than 
those goals and values.6 Members of the group are expected to act with integrity in their 
dealings with both other members of the group and those outside of it. 
Historically, law practitioners possessed all the hallmarks t~aditionally associated 
with a profession- law required highly specialised knowledge unlikely to be possessed by 
those who used lawyers and were therefore vulnerable to exploitation if market forces 
were to be the sole regulator. The entrepreneur's customer could identify what services or 
commodities were wanted, and judge whether a particular commodity or service would 
satisfy those needs. The lawyer's client could not. Precisely because clients lack the skill 
Rt Hon Justice I L McKay "Professions at Risk" (1993) NZLJ 104. 
"Businesses have been set up to create wealth, in the sense of using resources to best effect, and 
maximising income, and are not set up to undertake charitable functions". Roger Kerr, quoted in 
A Hubbard, "The Art of Finding Tax Breaks" Sunday Star-Times, ,Auckland, New Zealand, 17 
August 1997, C3. 
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and knowledge of lawyers they are unable to diagnose their needs or evaluate the service 
received. Recognition of this imbalance of power requires lawyers to act with the utmost 
integrity in regard to their clients. 
Although professionalism has been described as a modem version of the aristocratic 
concept of "noblesse oblige"/ Rickett places its origins in the latter part of the 19th century 
as a reaction to the social order of the day, dependent for its success on acceptance by those 
opposed to the market model. He argues that the dominance of the market model in New 
Zealand since the 1980s, the emergence of a plurality of world vie:;w,s in society, and the 
disappearance of a personal relationship, in any meaningful sense, between client and 
lawyer have severely undermined the extent to which modern legal practice can be described 
as a profession.R That view is one which is echoed by other commentators.~ It is, I think, 
unnecessarily pessimistic. None of these factors in and of itself militates against conceiving 
of law as a profession. 
The lament that lawyers are losing their way in the face of changes in society is not new. 
In 1895 commentators complained that the American legal profession had lost " ... the lofty 
independence, the_genuine learning, the fine sense of professional dignity and honor ... " and 
had '1 ••• become increasingly contaminated with the spirit of commerce ... "10 By 1931 the 
perjorative term "law factory" had been coined to describe large law firms which resembled 
" the efficiency and production of a first rate industrial plant".11 Writing in the Harvard 
Law Review in 1934, Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone deplored this commercialisation:12 
[I]t has made the leamed profession of an earlier day the obsequious servant of business and 
tainted it with the morals and manners of the marketplace in its most anti-social 
manifestations. 
N Tollemache, "Legal Ethics in General Practice - Commentary", in Legal Ethics above n 2, 70 . 
The growth of professional societies in the latter part of last century may support Rickett's 
argument but they also have their origins in older groupings, for example, the Inns of Court. 
Above n 2, 44 - 46. 
Most notably see A T Kronman, The Lost Lawyer- Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession, (The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1993). 
111 "The Commercialisation of the Profession" (March 1895) The American Lawyer 84-85 cited in M S 
Galanter and T M Palay "Large Law Firms and Professional Responsibility" in R. Cranston (ed) 
Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 1995) 189, 190. 
11 M S Galanter and T M Palay, above n 10, 191. In New Zealand, the emergence of national law 
firms, popularly described as "the big six" it is estimated that there are in excess of 200 non-lawyer 
practice managers or administrators in law firms m New Zealand. 
12 H F Stone "The Public Influence of the Bar", (1934) 48 Harv L Rev, 6. 
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To at least some extent, critics of modem lawyers view the past through rose-tinted 
spectacles. "The 'earlier day' when virtue prevailed lies just over the receding horizon of 
personal experience ... It is easy to believe that the way it is supposed to be is the way it used 
to be."13 That view is echoed by Brent Cotter QC and Christopher Roper in their report to 
the Council for Legal Education and the New Zealand Law Society who stated: 14 
It was pointed out to us that 20 years ago it was easier; the status and role of the professional 
was clearer. Nowadays law firms have to have regard to business efficacy in a climate in 
which the free market prevails. 
II MODERN LEGAL PRACTICE -BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? 
It cannot be denied that the firms in which many lawyers now practice are structured in 
a way which resembles the organisation of their business clients. That is hardly surprising. 
Law firms are simply another type of organisation. They are bureaucracies and although 
law firms continue to use the body of partnership, the reality is that many operate as if they 
were corporations. Within these firms there is intense competition for advancement, success 
is measured by productivity, and 'team players' are valued. Individual lawyers within the 
firm may find it difficult, if not impossible, to form a personal relationship with their 
client.15 Where the client is a large corporate there is the added complication of determining 
· just who the client really is - the director or executive from whom the instructions come, or 
the company, including its shareholders? In any event loyalty to the firm may deprive the 
lawyer of the necessary objectivity in terms of the client - lawyer relationship. 
But the fact that a law firm is run efficiently is not incompatible with professionalism.16 
In fact, it may mean that service is provided to clients in a more technically proficient and 
cost effective manner. In addition, within the firm individual lawyers may be required to 
conform to the highest professional standards, including ordinary ethical norms while being 
insulated from the pressures which lead some lawyers to violate ·those norms. The very 
structure of large firms may mean that clients are protected from neglect, incompetence and 
embezzlement.17 Their sins are rather those arising from over-identification with the client, 
13 Above n 10, 193. 
14 W B Cotter QC and C Roper, Report on Education and Training in Legal Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility prepared for the New Zealand Law Society, 1996,58. 
15 Above n 2, 53. 
16 Compare W B Cotter and C Roper, above n 14, 57 " ... what we propose is inhibited by the 
competitive environment in which lawyers must work." 
17 Most calls on the NZLS Solicitors' Fidelity Guarantee Fund have been from the clients of small law 
firms. 
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in particular, the corporate client where" ... subservience to the valued client may ... [lead] to 
a compromise of obligations to other parties and to the larger legal system".18 
. . 
Occasionally, clients will expect their lawyer to assist them in pushing the law to the 
limits. Particularly where the lawyer becomes· closely involved in a client's business 
decision-making they may be required to tread on wafer thin ice. In the area of potential 
wrongdoing by the client, the lawyer faces the greatest dilemma in terms of zealousness. 
"[M]any sophisticated frauds ... cannot be carried out without the active and knowing 
participation of a solicitor or other advisor."19 , .• 
While the majority of lawyers are unlikely to find themselves in that position, over-
identification with the client, even when acting within the law, can lead to unintended 
consequences: consequences which might well be avoided by recognition that as lawyers 
something more than technical adherence to prescriptive norms of legal practice is required 
of them. 
The consequences of identifying too closely with a corporate client are well illustrated 
in a recent article by Cranston.20 He refers to the part played by a City of London law firm 
in the 31-cquisition of the House of Fraser by the Fayeds (a prominent Egyptian family based 
in London). Inspectors appointed to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the take-
over concluded that:21 
in deciding not to refer the acquisition to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission the 
govemment had taken comfort from [various] assurances given ... by the Fayeds and, more 
importantly, from an impression which had been created that ... the law firm had aligned 
their reputations with those of the Fayeds. 
The law firm responded that solicitors do not generally give an imprimatur of any sort. 
This contention was rejected by the inspectors who stated:22 
We have little difficulty in accepting that these submissions were correct as a matter of theory. 
... In their relationships with the [Office of Fair Trading], however, solicitors are not dealing 
with High Court judges or experienced lawyers. They are dealing with intelligent lay people. 
18 Aboven·10, 196. 
19 D Kirk, "Blue Arrow: a legacy of suspicion", (1991) 5(43) 5 November Lawyer 4 cited in R 
Cranston, above n 10, 23. 
20 R Cranston, "Ethics and Professional Responsibility" in R Cranston (ed), Legal Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility, above n 10. 
21 Above n 10, 21. 
22 Above n 10, 21. 
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... Anyone reading [the] letter would have obtained the impression that the firm was in a 
certain sense vouching for the accuracy of what their clients had said. 
The inspectors concluded that the problem had arisen from a failure by the solicitors to 
"appreciate the dangers of identifying with their clients". In that case, over-identification 
with the client (or at least a perceived over-identification with the client) led to an 
overestimation by other parties of the strength of the dient's case. Wittingly or unwittingly, 
the solicitors became parties to misleading assurances given by their clients. 
Identifying too closely with the client has other pitfalls. Where 'a firm acts for large 
corporate clients and a large proportion of the firm's business depends on retention of those 
clients, there is a risk of "ethical tunnel vision".23 The desire to keep the clients business can 
lead to an underestimation by both lawyer and client of the potential risk of conflict where 
a firm acts for clients with competing interests in the same transaction. 
So -called ''Chinese walls" and "cones of silence" are devices used by some firms in an 
attempt to overcome the problem of conflicts of interest between clients for whom the firm 
acts. As Tony Lusk QC points out "[d]espite very clear indications from the courts that 
Chinese Walls and similar contrivances do not overcome the problem, the practice goes on of 
acting for multiple clients with conflicting interests."24 Firms justify the practice on the basis 
that each client has been informed of the situation and consents to the firm acting for both (in 
some cases, all) parties. But rarely are clients referred for independent advice as to potential 
risks before giving that consent. Lusk identifies this as a "big firm" problem, particularly in 
the case of major commercial transactions and negotiations and concludes that firms25 
are motivated to behave in this way by a combination of greed and arrogance - the arrogance 
being a belief that they are above the usual rules or that their important commercial clients 
can only obtain professional services of true excellence, by having their affairs handled by the 
firm concerned. 
Those who ascribe to the view that market forces are now the overriding determinant in 
legal practice might take a different view. A client (or clients) referred elsewhere because of 
a conflict may become a client lost to a competitor. 
These clients may well be receiving highly competent advice in the technical sense. 
Nonetheless, regardless of the underlying rationale, the practice of acting for more than one 
party in a transaction compromises the service which a firm is able to offer those clients 
even where the clients are advised by different persons within that firm. The allegiance 
23 D L Rhode "Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice" (1985) 37 Stan L Rev 589, 627. 
24 A A Lusk QC "Legal Ethics in General Practice- Commentary", Legal Ethics, above n 2, 66. 
25 Above n 24, 66. 
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owed by the' individual lawyer to the firm (whether a partner or not) coupled with the firm's 
desire to retain the client makes the provision of truly objective advice an impossible 
challenge. 
My view is that the problems illustrated in these examples have their solution, at least in 
part, in an understanding and acceptance by lawyers that as membeis of a profession there 
are limitations upon the manner in which they may act for clients. 
III THE MODERN LAWYER AS A PROFESSIONAL 
Much of the criticism of the concept of professionalism applied to the law has focused on 
its origins in the advocacy role of the lawyer. Today, many aspects of a lawyer's work do 
not involve advocacy in the sense of supporting the client in the face of an adversary. There 
may simply be no third party involved in any direct sense. For lawyers acting for large 
corporate clients most of the advice they are asked to provide may be of this nature, for 
example, in the minimisation of tax liabilities or obtaining finance for their enterprise. 
However, while there may well be no 'other party' in the adversarial sense the actions taken 
by the client will impact on other people. The result of tax minimisation for one client, 
corporate or otherwise, indirectly affects every other taxpayer by reducing funds available 
to the public purse. This is not to suggest that the lawyer cannot act for a client who wishes 
to achieve ends which may have adverse consequences for others, rather that, in acting for 
the client, the lawyer must have a conscious awareness of the responsibility she owes to 
society and the law. 
Lawyers do not act in a moral vacuum. They are not "simply technicians".26 They are 
required to exercise skill and judgment in the interest of their clients, not merely to carry out 
the clients instructions uncritically, whether acting as advocate or adviser. Lord Denning's 
admonition to advocates27 that they owe their first allegiance to. truth and justice, applies 
equally to lawyers in non-advocacy roles. While the client is entitled to set out what it is he 
wishes to achieve, how and whether it can be achieved are matters which are solely within 
the realm of the lawyer, as a professional. The client who does not accept that must "take 
their problem elsewhere"28 (always supposing that there is somewhere else to take it). This 
is a necessary corollary of preserving the autonomy of the lawyer but in a competitive 
26 R Cranston, above n 10, 5. 
27 "It is a mistake to suppose that [the advocate] is the mouthpiece of his client to say what he 
wants: or his tool to do what he directs. He is none of these things. He owes allegiance to a higher 
cause. It is the cause of truth and justice." Ronde/ v Worsley [1966] 3 WLR 950, 962 per Lord 
DenningMR 
28 Above n 3, 104. See also ForlJes above n 1, 13 "The client shopping around for a legal opinion to 
support a dubious transaction must find that they will be disappointed." 
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environment where client loyalty is no longer assured the lawyer is most at risk of seeing 
things the way the client wishes her to. Giving the client prudent, principled advice runs the 
risk of severance of the lawyer-client relationship, if that advice is not what the client 
wants to hear. Failure to do so, however, may also have that effect. 
When lawyers act without reference to the wider public good it is not only society 
which suffers. The client itself may suffer because the advice given is so focused on what the 
lawyer believes the client wants to hear that the client is provided with inadequate or 
incomplete advice to the client's subsequent disadvantage. In a very real sense it is in the 
interests of the client to receive dispassionate advice. I would suggest that this is 
particularly so where the lawyer (or her firm) acts across the full spectrum of legal services 
for the client. A lawyer may find that having provided advice to a corporate client in a non-
adversarial role she is then required, in essence, to justify that advice in subsequent 
litigation or investigation. If the initial advice has been inadequate, the problem may be 
compounded to the client's and the firm's disadvantage. 
In the context of non-advocate functions Rickett suggests that it is pertinent to ask:29 
if in trying to achieve her client's objective the lawyer would be achieving an unfair, 
unconscionable, or unjust, though not unlawful, end, or the lawyer would have to use unfair, 
unconscionable, or unjust, though not unlawful, means, should the lawyer decline to act? 
There is no easy answer to that question but it is one which all lawyers must consider in 
the course of practice. 
Clients consult lawyers not only because they have a technical knowledge of the law -
the ways and means of achieving legal objectives - but also, more importantly, because 
lawyers have experience in, and of, the law which their clients do not. A competent lawyer 
demonstrates not only technical capacity but also practical wisdom and judgment in her 
dealings with clients. In the words of Kronman "[a] lawyer whose only responsibility is to 
prepare the way for ends that others have already set can never be anything but a 
deferential servant."30 
Increasingly lawyers who work closely with corporate clients are involved in their 
client's (and in the case of in-house counsel, their employer's) business decision-making. 
While this has benefits for both lawyer and client/1 there is a danger that the autonomy of 
the lawyer will be compromised. In that event the result is loss for both client and lawyer. If 
29 Above n 2, 52. 
30 Above n 9, 15. 
31 For example, the lawyer gains intimate knowledge of the client's affairs and is able to provide 
advice grounded in that knowledge in a way an outsider cannot. 
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the lawyer focuses solely on the client's objectives to the exclusion of wider issues of justice, 
she deprives her client of a valuable service. According to Rhode, lawyers who fail to 
consider "the moral consequences" ofa client's actions may:32 
compound the deflection of responsibility that too often characterises organisational 
behaviour. Clients can justify asocial action on the grow1d that counsel have pronounced it 
not unlawful, while counsel can rationalise their participation by deferring to client autonomy. 
since judgment is not exercised in a vacuum the result of "[c]onceiving of legal practice in 
terms of judgment as well as skill, competence and habit" is to enabl~ practitioners to focus 
more clearly on "the relationship between theoretical knowledge and ethically guided 
action".33 In exercising judgment, the lawyer must balance "different, sometimes 
contradictory, considerations as part of the decision-making process".34 Technical 
arguments about whether particular transactions fall just within or outside of the law 
should alert lawyers to the wider issues at stake.35 
The law continually shapes social and political relations.36 The lawyer must be aware, 
and have an understanding of social relationships in order to assess the effect of various 
courses of action. Increasingly, politicians and the public look to law as a means of 
addressing social concerns. For that reason, the lawyer has an obligation to look beyond 
the client's immediate goals in order to provide the client with adequate advice. 
IV MORALITY AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW 
In his commentary on Rickett's paper Campbell asks whether there is "such a thing as 
betrayal of the ethical foundations of law, even when, in a technical sense, the lawyer is 
acting within the confines of legally permitted practice?"37 
The question must be answered affirmatively. Law is not separate from morality. "[T]o 
do what is legally required is not always to be morally in the clear ... "38 The nature of the 
32 Above n 23, 625. 
33 A Goldsmith, "Heroes or Technicians? The Moral Capacities of Tomorrow's Lawyers", (1996) 14 
Journal of Professional Legal Education 1, 4. 
34 Above n 33, 4. 
35 Aboven 1. 
36 An example is the perceived "judicial activism" of the Court of Appeal during the presidency of 
Lord Cooke of Thorndon. Likewise the current concem of business interests with the decisions of 
the Employment Court. 
37 A V Campbell "Legal Ethics in General Practice - Commentary" Legal Ethics above n 10, 57. 
JH T Honore "The Dependence of Morality on Law" (1993) 13 Oxford Joumal of Legal Studies 1, 17. 
9 
10 (1998) 28 VUWLR 
relationship between law and morality is complex, particularly in a pluralistic society. As 
Honore states:3" 
. .laws do not usually rule on moral conflicts directly .... What they are ruling on is the question 
whether to permit certain behaviour or a certain institution creates serious injustice between 
those who make use of the permission and others .... Not everything that is permitted is 
approved. 
Are lawyers, then, required to judge the morality of their clients ends? 
Many practitioners are uncomfortable with the idea that they should look beyond the 
narrow parameters of the law, in the legalistic sense, to issues of substantive justice when 
advising clients. They argue that in a democratic society the law is defined by the majority to 
best meet the needs of the majority. Arguments about substantive justice are to be left to 
society's elected representatives. 
The theory of role-differentiation suggests that lawyers may escape moral 
accountability for their participation in their clients' activities. Thus the lawyer may act 
With "unswerving commitment to the [client] company, without reference to other (human) 
parties who might have legitimate interests at stake (for instance, consumers, employees, 
investors, etc)" .40 As long as the lawyer is acting within her role she may be allowed to act 
in ways which, outside of that role, would be immoral. 
The proponents of role-differentiation justify the theory on the ground that in a 
pluralistic society the function of law is to "secure stable and just political community 
between the advocates of diverse views of the good".41 The role of the lawyer is 
fundamental to this function and the obligations arising from the role are fundamental to it. 
Those obligations require that lawyers act in certain prescribed ways and that " ... lawyers 
neither can nor ought to make [the] factual and normative judgments that more rigorous 
ethical obligations would entail".42 To do so is to substitute their own morality for that of 
"the ideal of neutrality between the reasonable views represented in the communities in 
which they apply".43 
For the lawyer busy with day-to-day practice the theory is seductively pragmatic. Faced 
with the client who wishes to achieve an end by morally, though not legally, dubious means, 
39 Above n 38, 16. 
40 Above n 2, 48. 
41 T Dare "Legal Ethics and Legal Education" (1997) NZLJ 311. 
42 Above n 23, 595. 
43 Above n 41, 313. 
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or to achieve a morally dubious, but not illegal, end, the lawyer simply acts as the client's 
agent in assisting with or carrying out the legal transaction. The question of morality is 
irrelevant. But as Rhode pointed:44 
this refuge in role provides a deceptive haven, one that extracts a considerable personal price . 
... Such a perspective offers one the illusion of freedom from responsibility, while in fact 
deliril.iting individuals' moral autonomy. At best, the result is likely to be a resigned submission. 
At worst, it can foster an enervating cynicism. 
The need to schismatize professional and personal moralities which the theory of role-
differentiation requires is neither healthy nor desirable. Lawyers should not be required 
"to do for a guinea" what, outside of the role of lawyer, they would consider it "wicked 
and infamous to do for an empire". That is not to say that lawyers should substitute their 
personal morality for professional morality. Rather they should remain alive to the tension 
which exists between the two. "[T]he real challenge" according to Kronman "is not to 
overcome the dilemma (for that cannot be done), but to resist the temptation to resolve it by 
always putting the client's well-being before the law's".45 At the heart of the lawyer's role is 
achieving justice and giving effect to the law. Routinely putting the interests of a paying 
client before these fundamental principles will inevitably compromise that role. 
Professionalism does not require that lawyers should be "moral saints"4" or behave as 
"hopelessly high-minded prig[s]" dispensing "Polonian advice"47 from on high. What is 
required is a recognition by lawyers that professional responsibility necessitates "a sense 
of when to conform with current conventional professional opinion and practice, and when 
to exhibit professional courage to act across the grain".48 In order to act professionally the 
lawyer must be prepared to live by honest answers to fundamental questions about the 
nature of her conduct since the decision to act for a client always represents a moral choice 
whether the lawyer is conscious of that or not. 
V CONCLUSION 
Even though the social conditions which gave rise to the concept of professionalism have 
changed I believe that the fundamental underlying notions of honesty, integrity and service 
44 Above n 23, 626. 
45 Above n 9, 145. 
46 
"I don't know whether there are any moral saints - if there are, I am glad that neither I nor those 
about whom I care most are among them": S Wolf "Moral Saints" (1982) 79 Journal of Philosophy 
419. 
47 Above n 9, 145. 
4R Above n 33, 2. 
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to society have continued relevance to practice into the 21st century and beyond. Because of 
their unique position in relation to the law lawyers must act "not merely in conformity with 
the law, but out of respect for it".49 In doing so they deserve the support of their colleagues. 
In a competitive, market-driven economy, that is not often easy but I would suggest that it is 
vital: 50 
When the profession of the law is reduced merely to business efficiency or to clever 
manipulations on one's client's behalf, then something is lost, not only to the practitioner thus 
. patronised by her client, but to the society in which such lawyers practie~., The law can help 
us reflect more deeply and concretely on our obligations to one another or it can help 
strengthen the Hobbesian perception of society as a state of constant and barely restrained 
enmity. 
In the environment in which lawyers practice today, it is more important than ever that 
they retain a sense of belonging to a profession. Unless they do so there is a danger that they 
will come to regard themselves, as will others, simply as technicians. The very nature of a 
lawyer's work requires more. Because they have skill and knowledge not readily available 
to their clients or to the general public, and because of the impact of the subject matter of 
their skill upon society, they must exercise that skill with honesty and trustworthiness. It is 
not enough for lawyers to suspend moral judgment when they start their working day. It is 
only by acting with integrity that the lawyer is able to reconcile the tension that exists 
between service to the client and service to society as a whole. 
49 Above n 37, 61. 
50 Above n 37, 61. 
